Guy H. Wight and Florence D. Wight v. Eugene Callaghan and Edna Callaghan : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1965
Guy H. Wight and Florence D. Wight v. Eugene
Callaghan and Edna Callaghan : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dan T. Moyle; Jensen, Jensen & Bradford; Attorneys for Appellants;
Richards, Bird & Hart; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wight v. Callaghan, No. 10248 (Utah Supreme Court, 1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/6
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY H. WIGHT and 
FLORENCE D. WIGHT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
EUGENE CALLAGHAN and 





... . . ~ - - . -
\.. .... '-,··-· : .. ·"_...,~- ..... 1~1'-- C-·u-~- ' ·' ·:. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF v ... ~J •• ~ •• 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Honorable Joseph 
G.Jeppson,Judge. · 
~ Ot \J\ -'¥\ 
· UNNut'-;)\\f DAN T. MOYLE 810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-
=.. 
~\'R '1. <J \965 
I,A.W. Ui~'t 
RICHARDS, BIRD & 
HART 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Respondents 
JENSEN, JENSEN & 
BRADFORD 
900 Walker Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE -------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ---------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Point I. 
The evidence does not support a finding 
that defendant, Eugene Callaghan, was 
liable for any claimed damages, except such 
as may have accrued between March 1, 
1957, and March 1, 1959, or after July 1, 
1960, and no damages are shown to have 
occurred during those periods of time ________ 4 
Point II. 
Plaintiffs have not proven that claimed 
damage occurred during periods leases 
were in effect ------------------------------------------------ 8 
Point III. 
Defendants should not be charged with nor-
mal wear and tear; nor with improvements 
beyond mere restoration ------------------------------ 9 
Point IV. 
The trial court erred in refusing testimony 
of subsequent oral revision or amendment 
of written contract -------------------------------------- 23 
Point V. 
Plaintiffs waived and are thereby estopped 
to claim damages occurring prior to execu-
tion of the third and last lease ---------------------- 24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page ! ! ! 
Point VI. 
Defendants cannot be charged with the loss 
of personal property claimed to have been 
left by plain tiffs on leased premises __________ 26 
Point VII. 
Finding 9 is contrary to the evidence. July 
1963 rent was not owed to plaintiffs __________ 27 
Point VIII. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to a judgment 
for costs not having filed a memorandum 
of costs as required by Rule 54 (d) ( 2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure -------------------- 29 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------ 29 
STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, 78-12-26 ( 1) ____________ 8 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 (d) (2) __ 29 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Law of Property, Vol. I, Page 350, 
Sec. 3. 79 n1 0 ------------------------------------------------ 21 
Brewer "An Inductive Approach to the Liability 
of the Tenant for Negligence" 31 B.U.L. 
Rev. 4 7 ( 1951) I L. Rev. Dig. 17 ---------------- 21 
Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Vol. 51, Page 859, Sec. 232 
----------------------
18 
V I 51 P 1102 18 0 age -------------------. ' -------------------
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Edwards vs. Ollen Restaurant Corporation, 198 
Misc. 853, 98 NYS 22 815 ---------------------------- 22 
General Mills vs. Goldman, 184 F 359 ________________ 21 
Mills vs. U.S. 52 Ct. C1. 452 -------------------------------- 22 
Slocum vs. Natural Products Co., 292 Mass, 
455, 198 NE 7 4 7 ------------------------------------------ 21 
Smith vs. Maxfield, 9 Misc. 42, 29 N.Y. Sup. 63 __ 20 
Wests Digest System, Principal and Agent, Key 
1~ -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Zimmerman vs. Home Building and Loan Asso-
ciation, 170 A. 703, 111 Pa. Super. 345 ______ 24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY H. WIGHT and 
FLORENCE D. WIGHT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
EUGENE CALLAGHAN and 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by landlords under three sepa-
rate and distinct leases for claimed breach of cove-
nant in allegedly failing to restore premises to as 
good condition as when entered upon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, defendants appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment 
against them, arid judgment in their favor as a mat-
ter of law; or, that failing, a new trial and a decree 
to the effect that Eugene Cailaghan can only be held 
liable for breach, if any, of covenants contained in 
the leases which he executed; that the trial court 
be required to determine which items of claimed 
damage, if any; arose during the time that Edna 
Callaghafi; alone, was liable, and which items of 
claimed damage are normal wear and tear for which 
neither Defendant is liable. The trial court should be 
further required to ~eliminate from the .judg~ent 
those items of claimed damage for which Defe;ndants 
are charged twice in the Findings and Judgment 
and eliminate the judgment for loss of personal prop-
erty abandoned by Plaintiffs. Appellants also seek 
reversal of the order disinissirig, without trial, their 
counterclaim; or, in lieu thereof, that the value of 
the improvements, the subject of the counterclaim, 
be offset against any sum recovered by Plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 18, 1957, Plaintiffs leased to De-
fendants, under a written lease, for a two-year term, 
at $225.00 per month, an old farm house, remodelled 
some 20 years previously, located at 3621 Highland 
Drive, Sa1t Lake County, Utah. 
bn February 25, 19'59, a new lease was made, 
covering the same premises, for a one-year term 
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at $175.00 a month. This lease was signed only by 
Guy H. Wight as Lessor and Edna S. Callaghan as 
Lessee. This lease expired February 29, 1960. 
On May 10, 1960, a third lease was executed to 
take effect July 1, 1960, and to expire June 30, 1963, 
at $200.00 a month, rent payable for 33 months only, 
though the term of the lease was 36 months. This 
lease was signed by both Plaintiffs and both Defend-
ants. 
During the time Defendants were in possession, 
they made certain structural improvements to prop-
erty, intending to buy it. Defendants filed a Coun-
terclaim for $4,602.35 for major improvements to 
the property. On motion of Plaintiffs this was dis-
missed by the Court prior to trial. 
Plaintiffs, during the period of occupancy by 
Defendants, entered the premises from time to time 
and made repairs of various natures. 
Mter Defendants vacated the property in July, 
1963, Plaintiffs brought this action claiming De-
fendants breached the covenant in the leases requir-
ing restoration of the premises in as good condition 
as when entered upon, except for reasonable wear 
and tear or damage by the elements or by fire. 
Upon trial, the Court found the issues in favor 
of Plaintiffs and entered judgment in their favor 
for $183.33 rent for July, 1963, $105.13 for items 
claimed to be missing, $258.43 for items claimed to 
be damaged, $10.00 for law.n seed, $775.88 for al-
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leged damage by water from a burst pipe during the 
fall_ of 1959 or winter of 1960, $26.00 for cleaning 
a dirty rug, $829.54 for painting and papering and 
restoring premises, $568.64 for attorney's fee, and 
$65.50 costs. 
Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, claimed $6.00 
for unpaid sewer charges, but this claim was not 




THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT· SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT, EUGENE CAL-
LAGHAN ,WAS LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIMED 
DAMAGES EXCEPT SUCH AS MAY HAVE AC-
CRUED BETWEEN MARCH 1, 1957, AND 
MARCH 1, 1959, OR AFTER JULY 1, 1960, AND 
NO DAMAGES ARE SHOWN TO HAVE OC-
CURRED DURING THOSE PERIODS OF TIME. 
In this action, judgment was entered against 
both Defendants for the entire damages claimed. The 
findings do not, for the most part, establish when 
the claimed damage occurred, except that it was 
sometime between the commencement of the first 
lease and the termination of the third. Eugene Cal-
laghan signed the first lease and the third, but he 
did not sign the second, and inasmuch as this is 
an action for breach of covenants in a lease, he can 
only be charged for breach of covenants, if any, in 
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those contracts to which he was a party. From the 
expiration of the first Jease, March 1, 1959, until 
the commencement of the term under the third lease, 
July 1, 1960, there was no lease in existence to which 
Eugene Callaghan was a party, and it was during 
this period of time that the greatest item of alleged 
damage occurred. (R. 19 Par. 15.) In fact, the only 
alleged damages identified as to time, occurred dur-
ing this period. 
At the trial, Plaintiffs endeavored to establish 
that the second lease was signed by Mrs. Callaghan 
as agent for her husband, but the proof submitted 
does not support such claim. 
At the time the three leases were offered in 
evidence, counsel for Defendants objected to the ad-
mission of the second lease, Exhibit 3. To this objec-
tion, counsel for Plaintiffs stated (Tr. 44 Line 20): 
It is our position it is continuing, and the 
wife did have authority to sign for the hus-
band and did sign it and the lease was fully 
executed by both parties, the husband and 
the wife, and that the defendant husband is 
bound by his wife signing on the lease. 
This statement by Plaintiffs' counsel is a des-
perate effort to tie both the parties to the second 
lease, but unfortunately for Plaintiffs, it is not the 
law. A purported agent who does not claim to be 
an agent and does not purport to execute in behalf 
of the principal and who does not have either real 
or apparent authority does not bind the purported 
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principal. Mrs. Callaghan did not purport to bind 
her husband. She did not execute the lease in his be-
half by herself as a purported agent. She did not 
claim to have nor did she have either real or apparent 
authority. She did not, therefore, bind her husband 
to the second lease. 
At the trial, counsel for Plaintiffs, after hav-
ing made the incorrect statement of the law quoted 
above, passed on without showing the claimed au-
thority. The Court thereupon, in an apparent effort 
to assist Plaintiffs' attorney (as the Court seems 
to have done several times during the course of the 
trial), reminded him that he had not furnished proof 
of authority for Mrs. Callaghan to bind her husband. 
The Court said (Tr. 45 Line 13): 
Mr. Kump, on number three, if you want 
to show agency so the contract would be bind-
ing on those who did not sign, I will expect 
you to put in proof. The mere fact it is ad-
mitted (in evidence) does not mean it is bind-
ing on the ones who did not sign it. 
To this, Mr. Kump, counsel for Plaintiffs, replied 
(Tr. 45 Line 18): 
I appreciate that, your honor. 
Thereupon, counsel for Plaintiffs, responsive t~ the 
Court's prompting, cross-examined his own client, 
Dr. Wight, in an effort to prove agency. This effort 
was futile. Dr. Wight explained that not only was 
the matter not discussed with Mr. Callaghan, but 
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he, Dr. Wight, and Mrs. Callaghan specifically 
agreed that the signature of Mr. Callaghan was not 
necessary. Dr. Wight testified (Tr. 45-46), that he 
did not discuss the matter at all with Mr. Callaghan. 
He testified : 
We discussed it with Mrs. Callaghan and 
she agreed she would sign the lease and I 
would sign the lease and we would not send 
it to Cyprus for Mr. Callaghan's signature. 
Counsel tried to get Dr. Wight to say that De-
fendant Eugene Callaghan had confirmed the lease 
by letter. This effort was also fruitless (Tr. 46). 
Had there been any letter of confirmation, we may 
be sure it would have been offered in evidence. Coun-
sel then probed for payment of rent by Mr. Cal-
laghan, but Dr. Wright testified (Tr. 46line 24): 
Mrs. Callaghan always paid the rent. 
It is elemental that the burden of proving agen-
cy rests on the party alleging it, and that agency is 
not presumed, but is a question of law which must 
be established by proven facts. (See West's Digest 
System, Principal and Agent, Key 19, and numerous 
cases cited therein.) Plaintiffs have not met this 
burden of proof and for that reason, if for no other, 
Defendants' appeal should be granted and the case 
remanded for elimination of all items of damage 
charged to Defendant Eugene Callaghan for pur-
ported damage occurring between the end of the first 
lease and the commencement of the third. 
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Point II: 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT 
CLAIMED DAMAGES OCCURRED DURING 
PERIODS LEASES WERE IN EFFECT. 
Any claimed damage occurring during the 
period when no lease was in effect, that is, between 
March 1, 1960, and June 30, 1960, as to defendant 
Edna Callaghan and between March 1, 1959, and 
June 30, 1960, as to Defendant Eugene Callaghan, 
would not be breach of covenant in a lease, but tort. 
Plaintiffs do not plead in tort, and had they done 
so, their claim would have been barred by the Statute 
of Limitations, this action having been filed August 
27, 1963, more than three years after the alleged 
tort could have occurred. Any claim in tort would 
thus have been barred by the provisions of Sec. 78-
12-26 (1), Utah Code Annotated 1953. Consequent-
ly, any claim for damages occurring within these 
time limits must be disallowed. This points up a 
fatal defect in Plaintiffs' case. Except for the water 
damage, which allegedly occurred during the winter 
of 1959-1960 (Findings, Par. 15, R. 19), there is no 
finding as to when any of the alleged damage oc-
curred. Dr. Wight testified that he did not know 
whether any of the items purported to be missing 
were there when the last lease was signed (Tr. 58, 
line 6; Tr. 103 line 13). The Court cannot assume 
that damage occurred during the leased period. That 
is a fact which Plaintiffs had the burden to prove 
and failed to prove. If for no other reason, the case 
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should be remanded to the trial court for a new 
trial to determine what, if any, of the claimed dam-
age occurred during the period the leases were in 
effect. 
Point III: 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT BE CHARG-
ED WITH NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR; NOR 
WITH IMPROVEMENTS BEYOND MERE RES-
TORATION. 
By the Findings of Fact (R. 18-20) upon which 
the judgment is based, the Defendants are charged 
with: the expense of cleaning a dirty rug, $26.00; 
the cost of replacing worn out and missing check 
ropes in the garage 60¢; a missing door stop in ga-
rage, $1.50; a worn out water softener, $100.00; 
paints and labor in redecoration; etc. It is Defend-
ants' contention that the damage claimed by Plain-
tiffs is merely normal wear and tear that can be 
expected from 6¥2 years' occupancy. 
Before discussing specific items of claimed dam-
age, let us see what the record reveals as to the status 
of the property at the inception of the lease. The 
home was purchased by Plaintiffs in 1937 (Tr. 40). 
It had been an old farm house (Tr. 40), remodelled 
before its purchase by Plaintiffs. ( Tr. 41.) They 
lived in it until1954 to 1956 (Tr. 41), a period of 
17 to 19 years. Then it was occupied for nine months 
by an employee of the Plaintiffs ( Tr. 171), an un-
married woman (Tr. 41), who had another girlliv-
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ing with her ( Tr. 42) . The record is not clear as to 
the length of time it was vacant prior to its occu-
pancy by this employee who moved in March, 1956. 
Plaintiffs testified as to different times that they 
moved out; Dr. Wight said in 1953 (Tr. 104) or 
1954 or 1956 (Tr. 41). His testimony does not ap-
pear to be very reliable. Defendants moved in during 
February, 1957. 
The nature of the home must be deduced from 
little items. It had no tile, only linoleum on the kitch-
en drain (Tr. 95); the drawer pulls on the kitchen 
cabinets were dime-store glass pulls (Tr. 57). One 
of them was broken ( Tr. 339). The glass door in 
the kitchen cabinet was broken (Tr. 326). The plas-
ter was in bad shape, and "sloughed occasionally 
and had done so before" on most of the walls, as tes-
tified to by the Plaintiff, Dr. Wight (Tr. 99). The 
plaster had come off in one place (Tr. 299). The rug 
on the living room floor had been down for 16 years 
(Tr. 106 line 16 and Tr. 138), and was pitted and 
stained with brown spots (Tr. 246 and 257). The 
yard was overgrown (Tr. 271) and by Plaintiffs' 
own admission there was debris in the yard left by 
the Plaintiffs (Tr. 113 lines 6-7). The home was in 
poor repair (Tr. 27 4; Tr. 250 lines 17-19; Tr. 252 
lines 12-14) . Only the basement bedroom and bath 
had been painted within the previous 3 or 4 years 
(Tr. 118 lines 2-6). Elsewhere the paint was 16 or 
17 years old (Tr. 152-153). It needed to be cleaned 
and decorated (Tr. 246). The shop was a rough 
workshop lined with 5 inch flooring (Tr. 119) until 
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its extensive remodelling and conversion into an 
office by Defendant (Tr. 120). There was a water 
softener at least 2 or 3, or more likely, 8 or 9 years 
old ( Tr. 125). There was trouble of some undisclosed 
nature in the basement, admitted by Plaintiffs, re-
quiring "rebuilding" every 5 or 6 years ( Tr. 132) . 
Obviously this was no immaculate mansion; and it 
should be pointed out that most of the references 
to the transcript, hereinabove referred to, are from 
the testimony of the Plaintiffs themselves. 
During the term of occupancy of the property 
by Defendants, the Defendants paid to Plaintiffs 
$15,400.00 in rents, and expended $1,560.63 in main-
tenance of the property (Tr. 318), not to mention 
the expenditure by Defendants of $4,602.35 in mak-
ing improvements and alterations to said premises 
(R. 6). During this same time, Plaintiffs charged 
off. $4,000.00 in depreciation on this property on 
their income tax return (Tr. 107), and received 
$775.88 plus $74.00 (Tr. 116-117) from .an insur-
ance company for damages, the same damages which 
are here charged to Defendants. Yet they expect to 
have their cake and eat it too, by compelling De-
fendants to restore the property not merely to the 
same, but to better condition than before their occu-
pancy. Dr. Wight testified that he replaced the old 
linoleum drainboard with tile (Tr. 95-96). The place 
was completely renovated throughout, all at the ex-
pense of the Defendants. To restore it to the condi-
tion at the commencement of the tenancy would have 
required merely old paint, a worn out rug, debris in 
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the yard, dime store hardware and "sloughing" plas-
ter. · 
Now, let us examine specific items. The Court 
allowed Plaintiffs $200.00 for damage to the living 
room rug. A spot 2 x 4 feet in front of the fireplace 
was burned until the nap was gone (Tr. 50). Plain-
tiffs both testified that this rug was 16 years old 
before Defendants moved in (Tr. 106 lines 17-18 
and Tr. 138). The Plaintiffs offered in evidence a 
piece of the rug, to-wit: the burned spot and the area 
around it. This was not admitted in evidence, but 
various witnesses were asked to testify as to the con-
dition of the area around the burn, to show, from 
this unburned portion, that the rug still had some 
useful life. But, this portion of the rug had always 
been covered either by a piano (Tr. 276), or, as Dr. 
Wight admitted, by a Navajo rug (Tr. 413 and Tr. 
423), so obviously it would not be subject to wear. 
Dr. Wight himself testified that this portion of the 
rug was not worn like the remainder (Tr. 427). 
Elsewhere, Dr. Wight admitted, the rug showed 
"considerable wear." On the stairs this same rug 
(Tr. 139) had holes worn clear through (Tr. 428). 
It is obvious that this rug was worn out, from 
15 or 16 years of tramping over it by Plaintiff and 
his family, 9 months by a tenant and 6% years by 
Defendants. That rug rendered service far beyond 
the usual time. An expert, Mr. Gray, testified that 
the normal useful life of carpet, "of a very good 
grade" is 15 years. (Tr. 228). An expert in the rental 
business testified carpet only lasted 10 to 15 years 
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before it became shabby and had to be replaced. 
This carpet had already served its full term of use-
fulness before Defendants moved in. That it was 
completely worn out 6% years later is only normal 
wear and tear. Only a small area was burned. Yet 
the trial court awarded judgment of $200.0 as to 
this same rug. 
Defendants are charged $100.00 for a water 
softener. This, too, by Plaintiffs' admission, was old 
when Defendants moved in ( Tr. 69 lines 3-4), though 
Plaintiffs also claimed that it was practically brand 
new ( Tr. 69 line 2). Water softeners are expend-
ible,·and this one was worn out when the Callaghans 
moved in. It broke down shortly after they moved 
in (Tr. 340), at which time Dr. Wight repaired it 
temporarily, but it did not last and had to be re-
paired repeatedly ( Tr. 340), before it was finally 
abandoned as worn out. 
Judgment was twice rendered against Defend-
ants because of a claimed burn on the linoleum drain-
board. This drainboard was old, cracked and deter-
iorated when Defendants moved in ( Tr. 340). Mrs. 
Callaghan waxed and shellacked it to try and pre-
serve it, but apparently not to the satisfaction of Dr. 
Wight. He replaced it with tile, for which Defend-
ants were charged not just once, but twice; once, for 
$45.00 in Finding 13 (R. 19), and again by inclu-
sion of the same item in the list making up the 
$200.15 item in Finding 17 (R. 20). Dr. Wight so 
testified (Tr. 96 lines 12-13). 
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Defendants are charged for breakage of items 
broken by Plaintiffs. The judgment includes $1.45, 
for broken electrical outlets and switches and $10.00 
for broken glass window. Mrs. Callaghan testified 
(Tr. 342 and Tr. 343), that Dr. Wight himself broke 
these and her testimony is nowhere controverted. 
These electrical outlets and switches were also 
charged to Defendants twice - once in Finding 
13 ( R. 19 ) and again by inclusion in the miscellane-
ous figure for materials, $200.15, Finding 17 (R. 
20). See Dr. Wight's testimony (Tr. 68 lines 17-
24). How many other items are charged twice, in-
cluded in both Finding 13 and Finding 17 it is im-
possible to determine, because the lists, constituting 
the $79.39 item and the $200.15 item were not 
offered in evidence and what they included can only 
be guessed at. Certain it is that some items, as shown 
above, are included twice and probably all of them 
are. The Plaintiff, Dr. Wight, testified (Tr. 89lines 
22-25) that· the "lumped figure" included the mate-
rial for ''all of the things that were done on the in-
side of the house.'' The case should be remanded for 
clarification of Finding 17 and elimination of the 
duplicate charges. 
Judgment was rendered against the Defend-
ants for $829.54 for renovation, painting and deco-
rating (R 20). This work was done entirely by the 
Plaintiffs themselves, except for $25.00 paid to a 
paperhanger. Dr. Wight claimed Mrs. Wight put in 
18 days cleaning and 12 days for painting and spack-
ling (Tr. 181-182). She herself testified to only 7% 
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days cleaning and that included one day spent clean-
ing the exterior porch and flagstones. (Tr. 146.) 
She also testified that this cleaning consumed as 
much time as did the painting (Tr. 145 lines 22-23). 
If she spent 6% days interior cleaning and an equal 
time painting, she spent far less time than her hus-
band testified to, and her testimony should have 
greater weight because he was not there all the time. 
He "left her off every morning" while he went on 
(Tr. 182 line 3). 
What was the nature of her "cleaning?" She 
said (Tr. 148), that she scrubbed and waxed the 
kitchen floor four different times; that 
after a certain period of work up there, I 
would get down on my hands and knees and 
scrub that floor and wax it again. (Tr. 148 
lines 13-14.) 
One cannot consider such a statement without 
a mental question, "If she scubbed it clean, ready 
to be waxed the first time, why do it again, and if 
not yet clean, why did she wax it?" If this is typical 
of her other cleaning, it is no wonder that it took her 
7% days. One is led to wonder how much the Court 
allowed for the second, third and fourth scrubbing 
and waxing. The findings do not show this. This 
standard of cleanliness is not required of a vacating 
tenant. They were required only to restore as it was 
before, less reasonable wear and tear. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Wight testified that she 
spent $300.00 worth of time during August, 1962, 
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during the term of the lease (Tr. 149). The judg~ 
ment allowed her $225.00 (R. 20). The Findings 
do not show whether this $225.00 was for services 
in August, 1962, or services after defendants va-
cated, nor whether she was awarded judgment for 
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th scrubbing and waxing or only 
for the first. There is no finding as to the rate per 
hour, so it cannot be determined if the rate was rea-
sonable. If any allowance was made for time spent 
in 1962, such must be disallowed. A tenant is not 
liable for work done by a landlord without the ten-
ant's request. 51 CJS 1093, Sec. 368 n 20, and cases 
cited. The trial court should be required to be specif-
ic as to the items for ·which judgment was rendered 
against Defendants. 
There is no testimony as to what Dr. Wight 
was doing all this time, except that he painted the 
walls after his wife washed and spackled them and 
painted the woodwork (Tr. 147lines 19-22). Assum-
ing that he painted and redecorated throughout -
that is only what is customary in the rental busi-
ness. It is not at all uncommon for a landlord to have 
to redecorate a vacated apartment after only a few 
months of occupancy, in order to find a new tenant. 
Mr. Noall, a disinterested witness engaged in the 
rental business, testified rental property must be 
repainted every 3 to 5 years (Tr. 165). Apparently, 
he felt tenants required a higher standard than Dr. 
Wight who felt that painting every 20 years was 
sufficient ( Tr. 125). Mrs. Wight testified that the 
only time the place was repapered and repainted was 
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"approximately 4 or 5 years after we bought it in 
1937 (Tr. 40), so it was repainted in 1941 or 1942. 
After that the only repainting, by Mrs. Wight's own 
admission (Tr. 143), ·was painting the laundry and 
basement. Here we have paint 15 or 16 years old 
when Defendants moved in, plus 6% years' occu-
pancy, a total of 21% to 22% years. Even by Dr~ 
Wight's own 20-year standard, repainting was long 
past due. Mr. Wheat, a painter of long experience 
(Tr. 297), who examined the premises when the 
Defendants first moved in, testified that even then, 
in 1957, there were 
water marks on the walls, underneath the win-
dows, the paper started peeling off, plaster 
-was in evidence in a few places, and the wood-
work was chipped in several places. (Tr. 298 
lines 22-25.) 
He did some painting then, as did Mrs. Callaghan 
also (Tr. 299). Six and a half years later, Defend-
ants are charged with complete renovation. The judg-
ment of the Court subjects the Defendants to the 
expense of restoring the property to the condition 
it was in 1941 or 1942, not 1957, and no allowance 
whatever is made for normal wear and tear. 
Judgment was rendered against Defendants for 
$26.00 for cleaning a rug in an upstairs bedroom. 
One can well imagine that a rug should be cleaned 
after 6% years' use, and the cost appears to be rea-
sonable, but cleaning this rug was not Defendants' 
responsibility. In normal wear and tear it is expected 
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that rugs will get dirty. The leases (Exhibits 2, 3 
and 4) specifically provided that the tenants were 
to clean curtains and blankets, linens and drapes, if 
furnished; but nothing is said about carpets or rugs. 
If it was intended that Defendants should be re-
quired to clean the rugs, the lease should have so 
provided. Itemization of specific items to be cleaned 
negatives the claim that other items not mentioned 
were also to be cleaned. There is no authority for 
the Court to amplify the provisions of the lease to 
favor the lessor. Rather the rule of law is directly 
to the contrary. Corpus Juris summarizes the law 
thus: 
In case of doubt or uncertainty as to the 
meaning of a lease, ordinarily it is to be con-
strued most strongly against the lessor and 
in favor of the lessee. (51 CJS 859 Sec. 232 1.) 
The inclusion of this charge in the judgment was 
error. 
It is appropriate, at this point, to discuss wh_a.t 
the courts have considered to be normal wear and 
tear. Corpus Juris Secundum defines "wear and 
tear'' as follows: 
Ordinary wear and tear, excepted in a 
tenants covenant to repair, includes the usual 
deterioration from the use of the premises in 
the lapse of time, in spite of ordinary care ~or 
their preservation, but not the total or partial 
destruction of the building or an appurtenance 
thereof by a sudden or unexpected catas-
trophe.*** 
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In general, the ordinary reasonable use 
and wear of property by a tenant within an 
exception to a tenant's covenant to make good 
all damages, breakage, etc., has relation to 
the depreciation in the condition of building 
or property which it undergoes, during the 
tenant's occupation, when the tenant, in the 
case of a residence, at least, does nothing in 
connection with the use more than to come 
and go and perform the acts usually incident 
to creating and maintaining conditions for 
living in the ordinary way. (51 CJS 1102.) 
Except for the loss caused by the freezing of 
the pipes, and a fire loss, both of which will be dis-
cussed later, Plaintiffs have shown no sudden or 
unexpected catastrophe. The property received the 
ordinary care for its preservation required under 
the law, as defined by C.J.S., supra. The expendi-
ture of $1,560.63 by tenants for maintenance of the 
property during the term of the tenancy (Tr. 318) 
testifies to that fact. Plaintiffs have not shown any 
unusual acts by Defendants. As a matter of fact, 
Defendants hoped to buy the place, until just the 
last few months of tenancy, so they certainly would 
do nothing to destroy it. 
But property does depreciate with the passage 
of time. Dirt accumulates, paint deteriorates, some 
breakage occurs in normal use and fixtures wear 
out. The law recognizes this depreciation and allow-
ance is made for it in the income tax laws. This de-
preciation allowance is intended roughly to equal 
the normal wear and tear. Plaintiffs put their own 
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estimate of this wear and tear at $650.00 to $800.00 
per year. (Tr. 107.) Simple arithmetic produces a 
depreciation figure of $4,225.00 to $5,200.00 for the 
6% years' term. Their total cost for restoration of 
the property to far better condition than it was at 
the commencement of the term, was substantially 
less than what they claimed on their income tax re-
turn as normal depreciation. 
If the need for cleaning, repapering and re-
painting is not a result of normal wear and tear, 
it is hard to conceive what those words would include. 
The courts have held that repapering and refinish-
ing are not the responsibility of the tenant, even un-
der a covenant to keep in repair. It was held in Smith 
vs. Maxfield, 9 Misc. 42, 29 NY Supp. 63, that 
A covenant to repair and make good any 
damage occurring through neglect of the ten-
ant, does not obligate him to restore the prem-
ises, upon the termination of the lease, to a 
condition better than they were in at the com-
mencement thereof.*** Tenant was not bound 
to make extensive renovations and was not 
liable to pay the landlord for making the same 
at the termination of the lease, where they 
consisted of re-papering and refinishing the 
woodwork. (Emphasis added.) 
Except for the ordinary wear and tear incident 
to 6% years' occupancy, there are only two major 
items of damage - the damage from the freezing 
of the water pipe (Finding 15, R. 19) and the burn-
ing of the rug (Finding 10, R. 18). Plaintiffs were 
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reimbursed for these losses by insurance (Tr. 116-
117), but judgment for them was also rendered 
against the Defendants. Defendants do not claim 
that they were entitled to the insurance proceeds, 
but they do contend that they were not liable, under 
the terms of the leases, for these items of damage. 
The lease specifically exempts the Defendants from 
liability for: 
reasonable wear and tear or damage by the 
elements or by fire. (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) 
It is because such exceptions are customary in 
leases that landlords customarily protect themselves 
by insurance, as Plaintiffs did here. 
It was error for the Court to charge Defendants 
with the fire damage, regardless of whether any 
negligence is traceable to the Defendants. The rule 
of law is set forth in Vol. 1, American Law of Prop-
erty, page 350, sec. 3. 79, n 10 as follows: 
An exception of damage by fire includes 
damage caused by lessee's negligence. 
In support thereof, American Law of Property 
cites General Mills vs. Goldman, 184 F 359 (C.C.A. 
8th 1950); Slocum vs. Natural Products Company, 
292 Mass. 455, 198 NE 7 4 7; Brewer "An Inductive 
Approach to the Liability of the Tenant for Negli-
gence," 31 B.U.L. Rev. 47 (1951) I L. Rev. Dig. 17. 
The same rule applies to the damage from the 
freezing and bursting of the water pipes. Damage 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
by the elements "includes all injury by wind, rain, 
snow, frosts and heat, as well as ordinary decay 
from natural causes." (Emphasis added.) Edwards 
vs. Ollen Restaurant Corp. ( 1950) 198 Misc. 853 
98 NYS. 22· 815. ' 
To the same effect is Corpus Juris Secundum: 
Ordinary wear and tear and damage by 
the elements, excepted from the lessee's cove-
nant to repair, covers repairs made necessary 
by water, which from freezing or otherwise, 
has caused outer portions of the building to 
be out of repair. (51 CJS 1102 n 33.) 
CJS cites in support Mills ·vs. U. S. 52 Ct. Cl. 452. 
The premises, as a whole, were in very much 
better condition when Defendants vacated than when 
they took possession. It is not disputed that the De-
fendants, with the approval of Plaintiffs, expended 
a very substantial sum in increasing the size of the 
living room, adding a room in the attic, installing a 
gable window and converting a workshed into an 
office. To charge Defendants with every conceivable 
item of damage, down to a 60¢ rope, but deny them 
any consideration for the $4,602.35 claimed by them 
to have been expended in improvements (R. 6), con-
stitutes unjust enrichment to the Plaintiffs to such 
an extent that it shocks the conscience. Defendants 
contend that the Court erred in dismissing Defend-
ants' Counterclaim- but even if the value of these 
improvements was not available as a counterclaim, 
their value, as contributing to the over-all condition 
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of the premises, should have been considered by the 
Court as a set-off. Because of this over-all improve-
ment of the property to a much better condition at 
the end of the leased term than at the beginning, the 
judgment should be reversed and the action dis-
missed. 
Point IV: 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TESTIMONY OF SUBSEQUENT ORAL REVI-
SION OR AMENDMENT OF WRITTEN CON-
TRACT. 
In the course of the trial, the Defendants at-
tempted to prove, from the statement of Plaintiff, 
that there had been a verbal variance of the terms 
of the lease pertaining to repairs. During the direct 
testimony of Defendant, Edna Callaghan, her coun-
sel, after questioning her as to variance by Plaintiff 
during the first lease, then started to question her 
as to agreements by Plaintiffs during the term of 
subsequent leases. He said ( Tr. 317 line 10) : 
You do not recall any discussio11 with re-
gard to cleaning and decorating by Dr. Wight 
after ... 
at which point he was interrupted by the Court with 
the words, 
I do not know it is important, no consid-
eration for it. He either had a duty or he 
didn't. What he said didn't make much dif-
ference. 
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It is entirely legal for parties verbally to waive 
requirements of a written agreement, and a lease 
requiring a tenant to make all repairs is not binding 
where there was a subquent separate agreement by 
the landlord to make repairs himself. 
In 51 CJS 1089, n. 54, the rule is stated: 
A provision in a lease as to who shall 
make repairs does not prevent parties from 
entering into a new and binding agreement 
governing the matter. 
In support thereof, CJS cites Zimmerman vs. 
Home Building and Loan Association, 170 A 703, 
111 Pa Super 345. 
Lease provision requiring tenant to make 
all repairs is not binding where there was sub-
sequent separate agreement by landlord to 
repair ceiling. 
Defendants' testimony on this point was erro-
neously excluded. 
Point V: 
PLAINTIFFS WAIVED AND ARE THERE-
BY ESTOPPED TO CLAIM DAMAGES OCCUR-
RING PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE THIRD 
AND LAST LEASE: 
Plaintiffs, knowing full well the condition of 
the property at the termination of the second lease, 
had a duty at that time to complain to Defendants 
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about the condition of the premises if they were not 
satisfied therewith, and by going ahead with the exe-
cution of the third lease, they waived any claim for 
prior damages and estopped themselves from there-
after complaining of or seeking damages for what 
theretofore might have occurred. 
Defendants, in asserting that Plaintiffs knew 
the condition of the premises, are mindful of the fact 
that the Court found that Plaintiffs were not aware 
of the missing items and damaged items prior to the 
termination of the tenancy June 30, 1963 (P.22 of 
Findings, R. 20) ; but this finding is directly con-
trary to the evidence. It appears from the evidence 
that Dr. Wight was frequently in and about the 
premises. The water damage was discovered by Dr. 
Wight in March 1960, after the execution of the sec-
ond lease and prior to execution of the third, and 
part of the damage, the dining room ceiling, was re-
paired by him at that time ( Tr. 54). In the fall of 
1959, he was there turning off the water· and the 
sprinkler system ( Tr. 121 ) , and he had to go inside 
to do it. As a matter of fact, Mr. Van Tassell testi-
fied that Dr. Wight had a key (Tr. 20, line 8), though 
Dr. Wight denied it (Tr. 187). Yet it is obvious from 
the testimony that he went and came at will, often 
without even announcing his presence (Tr. 395, see 
also Tr. 188). Mrs. Callaghan testified he was there 
very often, in fact every day, some of the time. (Tr. 
313). Dr. Wight himself testified that he had been 
there, "a great many times" ( Tr. 188 line 8). He 
was there when the doorway was cut in the attic 
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and pointed out the place to be cut (Tr. 71). In the 
face of the admissions by Dr. Wight, that he was 
there "a great many times," it was error for the 
Court to find that he was not fully aware of the con-
dition of the premises; and, if he was aware of the 
condition, then if he objected thereto he had a duty 
to say so. Yet he made no complaint (Tr. 314), and 
let Defendants enter into a third lease believing that 
all was well. He thereby waived any right thereafter 
to complain and is estopped to assert a claim for dam-
ages. 
Point VI: 
DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE CHARGED 
WITH THE LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT BY PLAIN-
TIFFS ON LEASED PREMISES. 
The Court a warded damages against Defend-
ants for $35.00 for loss of a saddle blanket, $4.50 
for a bird bath, and $2.00 for a sprinkler claimed to 
have been left in the garage (Tr. · 47 line 27). These 
items are all personal property. The premises were 
rented unfurnished by the express terms of the first 
lease ( Exhibit 2 ) . This lease states : 
It is provided that Lessors shall remove 
the contents of all buildings. 
The evidence that these items were on the premises 
when Defendants took possession is very weak. Allen 
Rydman, a young man who worked in the yard in 
1956 and was a witness for Plaintiffs, testified that 
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the bird bath was there the previous autumri (Tr. 
436), but did not testify that it was there when De-
fendants took possessio-n. Defendants testified that 
none of these items were there when they moved in. 
But suppose these items were on the premises 
when De!eridarits took possession. They had no re-
sponsibility toward them! In view of the provisions 
of the lease requiring removal of all property, De-
fendants would be justified in considering anything 
left behind as abandoned by Plaintiffs as worthless. 
It is well settled that personal property 
may be abandoned and ownership of it there-
by lost. (I CJS 13, Note 5.) 
Not only did Defendants owe no duty to Plain-
tiffs as to this personal property inasmuch as all 
personal property was specifically excluded from the 
pro~sioils o£ the le\ase, but the loss thereof, if wrong-
fully caused by Defendants, would not be a breach 
of covenant in a iease, but a tort. None of the leases 
included any personal property. Plaintiffs have not 
pleaded tort. They did not claim tort in their plead-
ings and any judgment based on tort would be be-
yond the scope of the pleadings and void. 
Point VII: 
FINDING 9 IS CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE. JULY 1963 RENT WAS NOT OWED TO 
PLAINTIFFS. 
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In Finding 9 (R. 18) the Court found that when 
Defendants vacated the property, July 31, 1964, they 
owed $183.33 to the Plaintiffs, and judgment is 
rendered against Defendants including this amount 
( R. 22). The date in the finding is wrong, but this 
is immaterial. What is material is the finding that 
Defendants owed $183.33 to Plaintiffs. 
Exhibit 1, admitted in evidence was a signed 
agreement dated July 10, 1963, providing for sale 
of the property by Plaintiffs to Glen Lane Van .Tas-
sell, to take effect July 1, 1963. In pursuance of this 
contract, an escrow was executed by sellers and buy-
ers and by the Valley State Bank, escrow holder 
(Exhibit 9). The contract (Exhibit 1), and the Es-
crow (Exhibit 9) were in full force and effect until 
August 10, 1963, and were then terminated by a 
Mutual Agreement (Exhibit 10). Dr. Wight ad-
mitted (Tr. 110-111) that this agreement (Exhibit 
1) was to take effect upon termination of Defend-
ants' lease. The lease terminated on June 30, 1963. 
The contract of sale took effect, July 1, 1963. The 
rent for July came due on the same date. By reason 
of the contract of sale, Van Tassell was entitled to 
the rent for July. At this point, there was no further 
privity of agreement between Plaintiffs and Defend-
ants, after termination of the lease and after the 
contract of sale went into effect. The later mutual 
release of the contract of sale would not transfer 
to Plaintiffs any obligation that had arisen in the 
meantime, without an express assignment from Van 
Tassell to Plaintiffs. There is no transfer from Van 
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Tassell to Plaintiffs of this right of the July rent, 
and the· inclusion of this item in. the judgment was 
error. 
Point VIII: 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS, NOT HAVING FILED 
A MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AS REQUIRED 
BY RULE 54 (d) (2), RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE. 
There is included in the Findings ( R. 20) , and 
by the Judgment ( R. 22) , $65.50 for costs. There is 
nothing in the record to substantiate this judgment. 
Defendants have no way of knowing what items 
made up this total. The Plaintiffs did not file the 
Memorandum of Costs required by Rule 54 (d) (2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this item should 
be stricken from the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment awarded to Plaintiffs by the trial 
court is, according to the Findings of Fact, composed 
of the following items: 
(a) Rent claimed to be due for July, 1963, 
(b) Damage to rug by fire and damage caused 
by frozen water line, 
(c) Cleaning, papering, painting, replacement 
of broken or missing items, including abandoned 
personal property, 
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(d) Attorney's f~~s and costs. 
It is the sincere contention of Defendants that 
none of these items are properly charged against 
Defendants. ·, 
(a) The rent f~r July, 1963, was not payable 
to flain~iffs. There was, at that time, no privity 
of agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants 
' ' . ' . ' 
anp Plaintiffs showed no assignment or transfer 
to th~m 9f.thi~ ~ho~~ in actipn · 
(b) The damage by fire and by freezing was 
a ris~ assumed py Plaintiffs as lessors, by the ex-
pr.ess terms of the lease~. To protect against thi~, 
they ca:rrie9, insurance which fully compensated them 
for the loss. :aut even if they had had no insurance, 
no liability would attach to the Defendants pecause 
of the e~press terms of th~ lease relieving Defend-
ants from liability for damage by fire and the ele-
ments. 
(c) The miscellaneous claims of Plaintiff are 
either for items of personal property, claimed by 
Plaintiffs to have been left 9n the property, and as 
to which Defendants had no responsibility,' or item~ 
of normal Wear and tear, as dis(!ussed in Point II~ 
above. Defendants are not liable for loss of personal 
property nor for norn1al wear and tear. 
(d) Defendants, not being liable for the other 
items of claimed damage, are not liable for attor-
ney's fees nor for costs, and the decision o~ t~~ dis-
trict court should be reversed, and the case remanded 
with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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Defendants also, at this time, again point out. 
to the Court their additional contentions: 
First: That no judgment can be granted against 
Defendant, Eugene Callaghan for alleged breach of 
covenants in a lease to which he was not a party. 
Second: That Defendants can be held liable for 
breaches of covenants only when the alleged breaches 
occurred during periods when leases were in effect, 
and this Plaintiffs have failed to show. 
Third: The judgment, as rendered, charges De-
fendants twice for many items of claimed damage, 
and for items of damage contained on lists not in 
evidence, the contents of which were not disclosed. 
Fourth : The Court erred in excluding testimony 
vital to Defendants' case. 
Fifth: Plaintiffs, by leading Defendants into 
execution of the third and last lease, without object-
ing to any claimed damage occurring prior thereto, 
waived any claim they might have had for alleged 
damages theretofore committed, and are estopped 
to claim damage for breach of covenants on any 
leases except the last. 
Sixth: Defendants, at their own expense, made 
valuable and permanent improvements to Plaintiffs' 
property, and the value of these improvements should 
be offset against any sum that might be awarded 
to the Plaintiffs. 
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In the event the Court does not completely re-
verse the decision of the lower court and order dis-
missal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, then upon the basis 
of any of Defendants' other contentions as set forth 
in the six preceding paragraphs, the case should be 
remanded to the lower court for a new trial, with 
instructions to eliminate: the rent for July, damage 
from fire and freezing, normal wear and tear, dupli-
cations, and, as to Defendant Eugene Callaghan, 
all items of claimed damage which arose during the 
time when no lease executed by him was in effect; 
and if the Court finds a waiver or an estoppel, that 
all items of claimed damage prior to the execution 
of the last lease, be likewise eliminated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN T. MOYLE 
810 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JENSEN, JENSEN & 
BRADFORD 
900 Walker Bank 
Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Appellants 
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